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Abstract
Experts can rely on statistical model forecasts when creating their own forecasts.
Usually it is not known what experts actually do. In this paper we focus on three
questions, which we try to answer given the availability of expert forecasts and
model forecasts. First, is the expert forecast related to the model forecast and
how? Second, how is this potential relation influenced by other factors? Third,
how does this relation influence forecast accuracy?
We propose a new and innovative two-level Hierarchical Bayes model to an-
swer these questions. We apply our proposed methodology to a large data set of
forecasts and realizations of SKU-level sales data from a pharmaceutical com-
pany. We find that expert forecasts can depend on model forecasts in a variety of
ways. Average sales levels, sales volatility, and the forecast horizon influence this
dependence. We also demonstrate that theoretical implications of expert behavior
on forecast accuracy are reflected in the empirical data.
Keywords: model forecasts; expert forecasts; forecast adjustment; Bayesian
analysis; endogeneity
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1 Introduction
In many forecasting situations there are two forecasts available. First, a statistical
model is used to produce a model forecast, which is based on available (past) data
and possibly other variables. Second, an expert creates an expert forecast. Usually it
is assumed that an expert first looks at the model-based forecast and then decides to
make an adjustment and, if so, decides on the size of the adjustment.
The literature on judgmental adjustments to model forecasts is extensive and grow-
ing, in particular due to the fact that more detailed factual data become available. Most
literature focuses on the quality improvement or deterioration caused by the adjust-
ments. In theory, judgmental adjustments by experts could make expert forecasts more
accurate than model-based forecasts. One of the main justifications for judgmental ad-
justment is that experts can recognize rare events that might influence the variable
under consideration but that are too irregular to be incorporated in statistical models
(Goodwin, 2000).
A few of the earlier studies on forecast adjustment using actual case study data are
Mathews and Diamantopoulos (1986, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1994), Diamantopoulos and
Mathews (1989) and Blattberg and Hoch (1990). In general, these authors conclude
that forecast adjustments lead to more accurate forecasts on average. More recent
work by Fildes et al. (2009), and research based on macroeconomic data in for exam-
ple McNees (1990) and Turner (1990), also indicates that in general expert adjustments
improve forecasting accuracy. However, all studies suggest that there is room for fur-
ther improvement. For example, Fildes et al. (2009) find that for only three out of
the four investigated companies judgmental adjustments increased accuracy on aver-
age. Furthermore, the above studies all document a general tendency towards making
positive adjustments.
There are also studies which report that expert forecasts are not necessarily better
than model forecasts. In an extensive study, in which adjusted forecasts made by dif-
ferent managers are analyzed, Franses and Legerstee (2010) document that managers
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do not deteriorate forecast accuracy at best, but that often model forecasts outperform
the expert-adjusted forecasts. Franses and Legerstee (2011b) show that similar results
hold for a range of different forecast horizons. These two studies, and also Sanders
(1992) and Fildes and Goodwin (2007), suggest that model-based forecasts may need
less adjustment and that experts perhaps put too much weight on their own contribu-
tion.
In sum, in theory, expert-adjusted forecasts should outperform model-based fore-
casts and in some cases they appear to do so. However, there is also evidence that
experts can reduce the forecast quality of model-based forecasts. These conflicting
findings trigger the natural question: what is it exactly that the experts do? And, how
does this behavior result in improvement or deterioration of forecast accuracy?
Although some recent studies have tried to answer these questions, there is no study
that takes all possible expert behavior into account. For example, Fildes et al. (2009)
and Trapero et al. (2010) focus on positive versus negative adjustments and on the size
of the adjustments when they evaluate what kind of forecast adjustments generate more
accurate forecasts. But what if experts do not look at the model forecasts at all? In that
case they are not making (positive or negative) adjustments and there is no relationship
between model and expert forecasts at all. If this is the case, how should we evaluate
forecast accuracy? Boulaksil and Franses (2009) used a questionnaire to find out what
experts do with the model forecasts and how they create final forecasts. Interestingly,
part of the experts state that they do not look at the model forecast before they create a
forecast themselves. The empirical results in Franses and Legerstee (2009) emphasize
the possibility that model forecasts are only partially taken into account in creating the
expert forecasts.
This leads to the next natural question: what would be optimal for experts to do?
How should they optimally incorporate the model forecasts in the final forecasts? A
structured discussion of this issue is absent from the current literature on this subject.
We believe it is important though, as insight into optimal behavior can guide methods
to evaluate and improve forecasts.
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In this paper, we therefore focus on the following three questions which we address
given the availability of model forecasts, expert forecasts and realizations: (a) Is the
final expert forecast related to the model forecast and how? (b) How is this relation
influenced by other factors? (c) How does this relation influence forecast accuracy? In
this paper we rely on theoretical arguments and we match these with actual data using
a model that is new to the literature.
Central to our approach is the relation
EF = α + βMF + I, (1)
where EF is the final forecast of the expert, MF is the statistical model forecast and
I is what we will call the intuition of the expert. This equation will turn out to be key
to understanding and analyzing expert forecasts. As we will argue, estimating the pa-
rameters of this relation provides an answer to the first research question. Interesting
cases are when α is close to 0 and β is close to 1, indicating that the expert closely
follows the model forecasts, and when α and/ or β deviate from these values consid-
erably. Besides the values of these parameters, it is also interesting to examine the
relation between intuition I and the model forecasts. Are there any factors influencing
the model forecasts that also influence through I? If this is the case, one could have
evidence for double counting, a phenomenon also described in Bunn and Salo (1996).
Relating α and β to various factors can provide an answer to our second research
question. For these factors one can think of characteristics of the realized data, R, like
the average size and volatility of R, and of personal characteristics of the expert. It is
here where we shall introduce our two-level hierarchical Bayes model.
Finally, relating to research question three, we show that the values of α and β,
the correlation between I and R, and the correlation between I and MF influence
forecast accuracy of EF . We provide theoretical arguments and we hold that against
our empirical data.
As we have actual data for individual forecasters for various variables and various
forecast horizons, we propose a two-level Hierarchical Bayes model. Its first level is
3
an extended version of (1) whereas the second level consists of equations that relate
the parameters in (1) to characteristics of the variable being forecasted, of the forecasts
and of the experts. Furthermore, we take into account the possible endogeneity of the
model forecasts in (1), that is, potential correlation between MF and I , which slightly
complicates parameter estimation.
For our case study we use a large data set containing model forecasts and expert
forecasts of different experts for stock keeping unit (SKU) level sales data of various
medical products. We document that values for α and β differ substantially across
products and experts. Factors such as average sales level, sales volatility, and forecast
horizon appear to influence the size of α and β. We also draw conclusions on the
optimal values for α and β in terms of forecast accuracy. As such, our study is the first
to relate expert behavior with expert performance using non-experimental data.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next two sections we
formulate the hypotheses which are the starting point of our data analysis and which
follow from theory and previous research. In Section 4 we describe the models that we
develop to test the hypotheses. Section 5 describes the data and the results of our case
study. The final section concludes.
2 Modeling expert behavior
What is it that experts do with model forecasts when they create their own forecasts
and how is this behavior influenced by other factors? We discuss these two questions,
where we assume that there are no records available of this behavior, and hence that
we have to use the actual forecasts and realizations to answer the questions.
Although most that we put forward in this section is true for any kind of forecasts
from experts, we focus in this section on forecasts for SKU-level sales data as this
matches our empirical illustration.
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2.1 What do experts do with model forecasts?
To refine notation, we define the relation between expert forecasts and model forecasts
as
EFt+h|t = α + βMFt+h|t + It+h|t, (2)
where EFt+h|t is the expert forecast created at origin t for t+h, where h is the forecast
horizon,MFt+h|t is the model forecast created at the same origin, for the same variable
and with the same forecast horizon and where It+h|t is the intuition of the expert at
origin t. We assume that for all t, E[It+h|t] = 0, where E is the expectation operator.
In later sections we describe and estimate a model for which (2) is our main building
block, where we assume availability of EFt+h|t and MFt+h|t for t = 1, 2, ..., T .
One typical situation captured by this model is when α = 0 and β = 1. This
can be seen as the benchmark situation, in which the expert closely follows the model
forecasts. On average over time, if the model forecasts increase (decrease) the expert
forecasts increase (decrease) by the same amount. The expert forecasts are on aver-
age not higher nor lower than the model forecasts (they are unbiased like the model
forecasts) and the only differences between model forecasts and expert forecasts are
captured by the intuition of the expert It+h|t. It+h|t covers factors that influence the
expert forecasts otherwise than model forecasts. In this situation a forecaster closely
follows the model forecasts and apparently trusts the model forecasts, but might decide
to increase or decrease the model forecasts based on factors captured in It+h|t.
A second interesting variant of (2) is when α 6= 0 and β = 1. Although the expert
still follows the model closely, the expert forecasts are on average higher (α > 0) or
lower (α < 0) than the model forecasts. Thus there is a constant deviation from the
model forecasts. The general level of expert forecasts is thus different than that of the
model forecasts. A potential reason for constant deviation might be that the expert
has another loss function than used by the model (which is typically mean squared
error loss). For example, the expert might believe that underpredicting is worse than
overpredicting.
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If α = 0, but 0 < β < 1, the relation between model forecasts and expert forecasts
is less strong than when β = 1. A change in the next model forecast dampens the
expert forecast in the same direction (on average). The expert feels that the model
forecasts move in the right direction but not to the right extent and this results in
0 < β < 1. At the same time, as α = 0 and E[It+h|t] = 0 and assuming the variable
to be forecasted is always positive2, the expert forecasts are on average lower than the
model forecasts.
If α = 0 and β > 1, the expert reacts excessively to the model forecasts. On
average, the expert forecasts move in the same direction as the model forecasts, but the
expert has reasons to believe that the model generally underestimates the trend in the
data. As α = 0, and E[It+h|t] = 0, and the variable to be forecasted is always positive,
the expert forecasts are on average higher than the model forecasts.
Finally, an extreme variant of (2) appears when β = 0. Here, the expert does not
consider the model forecast at all and the expert forecasts are determined by other fac-
tors. In this situation, expert forecasts do not entail judgmental adjustments to model-
based forecasts, as the expert gives his or her own independently created forecasts.
The expert forecast is equal to the intercept plus intuition.
Of course, there are other variants, like when α > 0 and 0 < β < 1. Here
the expert forecasts do not necessarily deviate from the model forecasts (they might
on average approximately be the same). The expert only partially follows the model
forecasts, and uses corrections via the intercept.
In sum, expression (2) encompasses many of the possible expert forecasting prac-
tices and it is a good starting point for our analysis. It would now be interesting if there
is any empirical evidence of the values of α and β. Recently, more data sets have be-
come available containing statistical model forecasts and expert forecasts. Boulaksil
and Franses (2009) showed with a questionnaire that 50% of the responding man-
agers do not rely on the model forecasts when they create their final forecasts. This
2For our SKU-level sales data this is in general the case.
6
suggests that β is smaller than 1, or, stated differently, closer to 0. In Franses and
Legerstee (2009) the parameters in model (2) are estimated using SKU-sales data and
it is reported that β is close to 0.4, on average, and there is a large variety of potential
estimated values.
Fildes et al. (2009) and Mathews and Diamantopoulos (1986) show that often the
differences between expert forecasts and model forecasts are positive. Fildes et al.
(2009) find for their one-step-ahead forecasts of SKU-sales more positive than negative
adjustments and they also find that the upward adjustments tend to lead to final expert
forecasts that overpredict. Franses and Legerstee (2011a) show that for forecasts with
horizons ranging from one to twelve months there are more positive adjustments than
negative adjustments. This might capture the preference of a manager to overpredict
in order to prevent being out of stock and thus that managers may have a loss function
different than that of the model forecasts. If we relate these findings to (2), we could
state that for many experts α is larger than 0, that β is different from 1, or both.
If β < 1, as is frequently observed, then the observed upward adjustments imply
that α is often larger than 0. Even if there would not be an upward bias in the expert
forecasts, a positive α makes sense in case of a β smaller than 1, in order to prevent a
downward bias in the final forecasts, assuming that the model forecasts are unbiased.
To summarize, we put forward the following two hypotheses
Hypothesis 1
a. Often β 6= 1 in (2).
b. When β 6= 1, often β < 1 in (2).
Hypothesis 2
a. Often α 6= 0 in (2).
b. When α 6= 0, often α > 0 in (2).
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2.2 What causes β 6= 1 and α 6= 0?
Now that we have an idea about what it is that experts could do with model forecasts
and what they might often do, we can look for factors that determine this behavior.
From the questionnaire results reported in Boulaksil and Franses (2009) we learn
that managers are quite confident about their own ability to forecast and that they lack
confidence in the model forecasts. As products with large sales volumes might be
more important to a manager and as predictions for near-by sales are probably more
important because of their urgency, the manager might put even less trust in the model
in these situations. Boulaksil and Franses (2009) also find that recent volatile sales
figures decreases the trust by managers in the model and they feel the need to make
even more adjustments, which thus would result in an even lower value for β. Fildes
et al. (2009) investigate if judgmental forecasts improve the forecast accuracy when
sales volume volatility is high, but they find evidence of the opposite. These authors
suggest that volatile series are more difficult to forecast, but with Boulaksil and Franses
(2009) we would argue that it can also be due to excessive adjustment. We therefore
hypothesize the following
Hypothesis 3 The probability that β in (2) deviates away from 1 towards 0 in-
creases when
a. the mean of a target variable is higher;
b. a target variable fluctuates more;
c. the forecast horizon decreases.
When a manager wants to prevent being out of stock, then higher average sales
volumes and more volatility increases the size of forecast adjustments. Furthermore,
Franses and Legerstee (2011a) show that adjustments are more often upwards than
downwards for all forecast horizons, but that this is most prominent for shorter hori-
zons. Hence, we conjecture that
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Hypothesis 4 The probability that α in (2) deviates away from 0 increases when
a. the mean of a target variable is higher;
b. a target variable fluctuates more;
c. the forecast horizon decreases.
In Section 4 we propose an econometric model with which can put these hypothe-
ses to a test.
2.3 Experts’ intuition
When the managers do not trust the model forecasts and make their own forecasts, it
is quite likely that there are factors which influence both model forecasts and expert
forecasts. Managers have stated in the questionnaire reported in Boulaksil and Franses
(2009) that they include recent sales figures as input to their forecast adjustments, even
though they know that recent sales figures are also covered by the statistical model
forecasts. This is in accordance with the lab findings of Goodwin and Fildes (1999),
which is that experts do not only look at special events for their adjustments, but they
also consider past data. As these past (sales) data are usually also the input for the
models used to create the model forecasts, the result would be a correlation between
MFt+h|t and It+h|t in (2), or stated differently E(MFt+h|tIt+h|t) 6= 0. So, our final
hypothesis about expert forecasting behavior is
Hypothesis 5 MF is often endogenous in (2), meaning E[MFt+h|tIt+h|t] 6= 0.
Note that MF being endogenous (and thus not exogenous) has two important im-
plications. First of all, it tells us something about what the experts do. It shows that
experts use the same information as the model forecasts, possibly in the same way, but
more likely in another way. The result could amount to double counting, or at least to
an inefficient use of information, especially when the model forecasts are optimal in
processing that same information.
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The second implication of the endogeneity of MF in (2) has to do with parameter
estimation. It is well known that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results in an incon-
sistent estimate of β if MF is endogenous, see Heij et al. (2004, p. 396-418). This
may result in incorrect conclusions about what it is that experts do with model fore-
casts. For example, it may seem that there is a strong relation between EF and MF
with β ≈ 1, while in fact the expert does not look at the model forecasts at all, but
simply uses the same factors as input for his or her forecasts as the statistical model
used when creating the model forecasts. How to deal with this estimation issue is dis-
cussed in Section 4. Before we turn to our econometric model, we first discuss various
implications of expert behavior on forecast accuracy.
3 Theoretical implications for accuracy
In this section we demonstrate the theoretical link between the behavior of the experts
and their forecasting accuracy. To our knowledge this has never been done before in
the literature.
To study the implications of deviating from the benchmark α = 0 and β = 1,
we need to propose a loss function to evaluate forecast accuracy. We propose to con-
sider a variant of the well-known and often used root mean squared prediction error
(RMSPE), and this variant is the expected squared prediction error (ESPE) defined
by
ESPE = E[(Rt+h − EFt+h|t)2], (3)
where EFt+h|t is as defined before and where Rt+h is the realization at t+h. This loss
function is chosen for convenience, and also because it gives implementable optimality
results for α, β and I , as the managers only have expected values of sales instead
of realized values when they create their forecasts. The conclusions obtained in this
section with this loss function can be generalized to other loss functions, such as the
mean squared prediction error (MSPE), theRMSPE and the difference between the
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(R)MSPE of the model and that of the expert (D(R)MSPE).
If (2) is substituted in (3) we obtain
ESPE = E[(Rt+h − α− βMFt+h|t)2] + E[I2t+h|t]
− 2E[((Rt+h − βMFt+h|t)It+h|t], (4)
where we have used that E[It+h|t] = 0. The expert can influence three factors of the
ESPE, and these are α, β and It+h|t. For each of these we will discuss the optimal
values of α, β and It+h|t that minimize ESPE, and how deviations from the optimal
values will influence this ESPE.
3.1 Optimal settings
For ease of derivation, at first we assume that MF is exogenous in (2) and thus that
E[MFt+h|tIt+h|t] = 0. Later on we will relax this assumption.
∂ESPE
∂α
= 0 gives the value for α that minimizes ESPE, and that is the OLS
estimate of the constant term in equation (2) given by
αopt = E[Rt+h]− βE[MFt+h|t]. (5)
∂ESPE
∂β
= 0 and then substituting it with the optimal value for α in (5) gives the optimal
value for β, that is,
βopt =
E[MFt+h|tRt+h]− E[MFt+h|t]E[Rt+h]
E[MF 2t+h|t]− E[MFt+h|t]2
=
Cov[MFt+h|t, Rt+h]
V[MFt+h|t]
, (6)
where Cov means covariance and V denotes variance. Under the condition that the
model forecasts are unbiased relative to expected realizations, thus E[MFt+h|t] =
E[Rt+h|t], we see that the more E[MFt+h|tRt+h] differs from E[MF 2t+h|t], the more
βopt differs from 1. However, under the additional condition that E[MFt+h|tRt+h] =
E[MF 2t+h|t], we obtain that βopt = 1 and αopt = 0. We could call this addi-
tional condition the relative unbiasedness of the model forecasts. What this rela-
tive unbiasedness means is perhaps most easily understood by looking at the estima-
tors of E[MFt+h|tRt+h] and E[MF 2t+h|t], which are
∑
MFt+h|tRt+h and
∑
MF 2t+h|t,
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where the summations
∑
run over a sample of data. The condition is not met if∑
MFt+h|tRt+h −
∑
MF 2t+h|t < 0, which occurs when MF is larger than R espe-
cially for the larger MF , or if
∑
MFt+h|tRt+h−
∑
MF 2t+h|t > 0, which occurs when
MF is smaller than R especially for the larger MF .
To get more insight into this relative unbiasedness we consider an example. Sup-
pose we have only two observations (T = 2), with realizations R2 = 5 and R3 = 15
and we have two different sets (marked with superscripts) of one-month-ahead model
forecasts, namely {MF 12|1 = 10,MF 13|2 = 10} and {MF 22|1 = 11,MF 23|2 = 9}.
The first set of model forecasts is unbiased and relatively unbiased, as
∑
Rt+h =∑
MFt+h|t and
∑
MFt+h|tRt+h =
∑
MF 2t+h|t. The second set of model fore-
casts is unbiased, but not relatively unbiased, because
∑
MFt+h|tRt+h = 190 and∑
MF 2t+h|t = 202. We see now that deviations of MF from R have more weight
for larger MF . If
∑
MFt+h|tRt+h −
∑
MF 2t+h|t < 0, a value for β smaller than 1
is optimal and if
∑
MFt+h|tRt+h −
∑
MF 2t+h|t > 0, a value for β larger than 1 is
optimal (see (6)).
Finally, let us look at the influence of It+h|t on ESPE. Remember that we re-
stricted I and MF to be uncorrelated. Although it is impossible to derive for It+h|t
what its optimal value is, we can see from (4) that adding intuition is only beneficial
for reducing the expected forecast error if R and I are positively correlated (see the
negative sign before the third right-hand-side element). To be more precise, it should
hold that
2Cov[Rt+hIt+h|t] > V[It+h|t], (7)
which means that the covariance between R and I should be larger than half the vari-
ance of I . However, we restricted I and MF to be uncorrelated and we might assume
a strong correlation between R and MF . The stronger the last two are related, the
harder it is for I and R to be correlated, while maintaining the exogeneity of MF
in (2). Note that this conclusion supplements the conclusion of Blattberg and Hoch
(1990, pp. 890-891), who state that combinations between model and expert forecasts
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will be more accurate than the model or expert forecasts separately if the intuition of
the expert is related to the true values.
If we relax the exogeneity assumption that E[MFt+h|tIt+h|t] = 0, matters get more
complicated. Working in the same way as for the case of exogenous model forecasts,
we find the following value of α that minimizes ESPE:
αopt = E[Rt+h]− βE[MFt+h|t], (8)
which is the same as before, and the following value of β that minimizes ESPE:
βopt =
E[MFt+h|tRt+h]− E[MFt+h|t]E[Rt+h]− E[MFt+h|tIt+h|t]
E[MF 2t+h|t]− E[MFt+h|t]2
=
Cov[MFt+h|t, Rt+h]− Cov[MFt+h|tIt+h|t]
V[MFt+h|t]
, (9)
which is different than before. If we assume the model forecasts to be unbiased and
relatively unbiased we obtain
αopt =
Cov[MFt+h|tIt+h|t]
V[MFt+h|t]
E[MFt+h|t], (10)
βopt = 1− Cov[MFt+h|tIt+h|t]V[MFt+h|t] . (11)
We can see that the optimal value of β is now negatively correlated with the covariance
between MF and I . The higher the correlation, the lower βopt should be, and vice
versa. This is intuitively understandable, as a high covariance between MF and I
and a high β (equal to 1 or higher) would result in double counting. In that case the
expert fully takes the model forecasts into account, but also lets the final forecasts be
influenced by the same factors that determine the model forecasts.
At the same time, a higher covariance between MF and I should result in a higher
value for α because of a lower value for β. As E[It+h|t] = 0, α should in this case be
different from 0 to make the expert forecasts unbiased.
The question now is: how beneficial is it for the expert to relate intuition to the
model forecasts and to what extent? If we look at (4), our initial idea could be that a
high correlation between R and I and a low, preferably negative, correlation between
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MF and I is best for expert forecast accuracy. Assuming unbiased and relatively
unbiased model forecasts this would result in a βopt larger than 1 and a negative αopt.
However, the gains in forecast accuracy achieved when I is positively related to R
and when it is negatively related to MF are offset by the second term in (4), that is, a
higher variance of I increases the forecast error. Furthermore, the moreR andMF are
related, the harder it is to let I be positively correlated withR and negatively correlated
with MF .
If R and MF are not that strongly related, it might be best to choose It+h|t in
such a way that it corrects for the mistakes that the model forecasts make, thus to let
factors that wrongly influence MF negatively influence I . This results in a negative
correlation between I and MF and a positive correlation between I and R. In that
case β should be larger than 1.
In short, we have to take a closer look at the last two terms in (4). We observe that
adding intuition is only beneficial if
2E[(Rt+h − βMFt+h|t)It+h|t] > V[It+h|t]. (12)
Hence, a necessary condition is that intuition is positively correlated with (Rt+h −
βMFt+h|t), which implies that E[Rt+hIt+h|t] > βE[MFt+h|tIt+h|t]. Thus for β = 1,
the correlation between intuition and realization has to be larger than the correlation
between intuition and model forecast.
3.2 Implications and hypotheses
Before we summarize the above in a set of statements we define the following condi-
tions:
E[Rt+h] = E[MFt+h|t], (13)
E[MFt+h|tRt+h] = E[MF 2t+h|t]. (14)
Furthermore, we generalize the above results to the difference between the ESPE of
the model and that of the expert (DESPE), as usually the interest is in deterioration or
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improvement of the expert forecasts over the model forecasts. If we obtain a minimum
value ofESPE for particular values of α, β and It+h|t, we also obtain an optimal value
of DESPE, meaning that (for given model forecasts) DESPE is at its maximum
value.
Statements In order to have maximum improvement in expected forecast ac-
curacy of EF over MF it has to hold in (2) that,
a. α = 0, β = 1, and (7) is met for It+h|t, assuming that (13) and (14) are met
and that E[MFt+h|tIt+h|t] = 0;
b. α is as in (10), β as in (11), and (12) is met for It+h|t, if (13) and (14) are
met, but possibly E[MFt+h|tIt+h|t] 6= 0;
c. α is as in (8), β as in (9), and (12) is met for It+h|t, if (13) and (14) are not
met and possibly E[MFt+h|tIt+h|t] 6= 0.
Note that (7) and (12) are minimum requirements for intuition to be beneficial and
for DESPE to be optimal.
Any deviation from the optimal values for α and β and from (12) results in higher
prediction errors for EF , where the amount of loss of precision depends on the inter-
action between α, β and It+h|t. For example, in case β is larger than 1, and the model
forecasts are unbiased, relatively unbiased (conditions (13) and (14) are met) and ex-
ogenous in (2), it is optimal that α is smaller than 0. Furthermore, in that case, the
correlation between the intuition of the expert and the realized values should be even
larger than when β equals 1.
Although the described behavior is theoretically the behavior that generates the
most accurate forecasts, it is questionable whether an expert can act according to the
statements (a) to (c) in practice. The interactions between the various determinants
of forecast accuracy, especially when taking into account the possibility that the con-
ditions are not met, are quite complex. Furthermore, for a given set of actual model
forecasts it might be assumed that conditions (13) and (14) are met approximately and
thatR andMF are strongly related in general. Therefore we put forward the following
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simpler hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6 The improvement in expected forecast accuracy of EF over that
of MF increases when in (2)
a. α is 0 or α gets closer to 0;
b. β is 1 or β gets closer to 1;
c. the correlation between MF and I decreases;
d. the correlation between I and R increases.
For a given data set, for which we do not have reasons to doubt that the conditions
as defined in (13) and (14) are met, it might be interesting to test Hypothesis 6.
4 Empirical models
In this section we will explain in detail how a (non-trivial) econometric model can
be constructed to validate the components of Hypothesis 6. We first consider expert
behavior and then its link with forecast accuracy.
4.1 Model of expert behavior
In this section we propose a model to estimate what the experts do with the model
forecasts and which factors influence this behavior. It is a two-level Hierarchical Bayes
model, for which the parameters can be estimated using panel data, consisting of model
forecasts and expert forecasts for different products and for different time periods.
To meet the typical data format in practice, and also to reduce notational burden, we
now introduce a slightly different notation. LetEFi,t denote the expert forecast created
in period t for case i, where i covers products and forecast horizons. Furthermore,
MFi,t is the model forecast created in that same period, for that same product and
with the same forecast horizon. Let Ti be the number of observations for product and
forecast horizon denoted with i, which can take a maximum value of T . There are
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N product-horizon combinations and thus time series. See Appendix A for a more
detailed explanation of the data format. Using this notation we can then write (2) as
EFi,t −MFi,t = α∗i + β∗iMFi,t + εi,t, (15)
with εi,t ∼ N(0, σ2ε,i). Note that β∗i in this model associates with β − 1 in (2) and α∗i
with α in (2). This expression constitutes the first level of our model.
To correctly estimate the parameters and to see which factors influence α∗i and β
∗
i
over t, we add a second level to the model. As α∗i = 0 and β
∗
i = 0 are the special
benchmark cases in the behavior of experts and the forecast accuracy related to it, we
take these as our starting point.
Let zi be a vector containing explanatory variables such as mean and volatility of
the variable being forecasted, we can expand the model with
α∗i =
0 if Pi = 1α†i = z′iγα + ξi if Pi = 0, (16)
and
β∗i =
0 if Si = 1β†i = z′iγβ + ηi if Si = 0, (17)
with ξi ∼ N(0, σ2ξ ) and ηi ∼ N(0, σ2η). Pi and Si are unobserved variables which can
take values 1 and 0. With Pr[Pi = 1] = κi and Pr[Si = 1] = λi, we assume that there
is an unconditional probability of size κi that α∗i = 0 and that there is an unconditional
probability of λi that β∗i = 0. Stated differently, with a probability of κi times λi
the expert forecasts of case i follow the model forecasts closely and match with the
benchmark situation as described in Section 2.1. If α∗i differs from 0 it equals α
†
i which
is then conditional normally distributed and which depends linearly on the variables in
zi. If β∗i differs from 0 it equals β
†
i which is also conditional normally distributed and
which also depends linearly on the variables in zi, but with other parameters (γβ).
If we consider qi and wi to be unobserved random variables, we use the following
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conditional probabilities:
Pi =
1 if qi = z
′
iψα + νi > 0
0 if qi = z′iψα + νi ≤ 0,
(18)
and
Si =
1 if wi = z
′
iψβ + ωi > 0
0 if wi = z′iψβ + ωi ≤ 0,
(19)
with νi ∼ N(0, 1) and ωi ∼ N(0, 1). Stated differently, the probabilities that Pi = 1
(α∗i = 0) and that Si = 1 (β
∗
i = 0) are defined as a probit model with zi as explanatory
variables. We can also write this as
κi =
∫ ∞
0
φ(qi; z
′
iψα, 1)dqi, (20)
and
λi =
∫ ∞
0
φ(wi; z
′
iψβ, 1)dwi, (21)
where φ(·; c1, c2) is the probability density function (pdf) of a normal distribution with
mean c1 and variance c2. Thus, the variables in zi are related to α
†
i and β
†
i , but also to
the probabilities that α∗i = 0 and that β
∗
i = 0. Although we use for all four relations the
same zi here, it is of course also possible to use different sets of explanatory variables.
Equations (16), (17), (20) and (21) constitute the second level of our model.
Sofar we have assumed that the error terms in our basic equation (15) are unre-
lated to the model forecasts, and thus that the model forecasts are exogenous. It is
however very well possible that there is correlation between these two components, as
explained in Section 2.3. If this problem is ignored we might find values for β∗i that
are inconsistent. To account for possible endogeneity in the first equation we therefore
add the following component to the model, that is,
MFi,t = µi + δiVi,t + ζi,t, (22)
with Vi,t an instrumental variable. Now we have (εi,t, ζi,t)′ ∼MN(0,Ωi), where εi,t is
from (15) and where MN(0,Ωi) is the bivariate normal distribution with mean 0 for
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both variables and with covariance matrix Ωi (which is a 2 × 2 matrix). If there is no
correlation between εi,t and ζi,t, or, stated differently, Ωi(1, 2) = Ωi(2, 1) = 0, there is
no endogeneity.
Taking everything together, the full final model now reads as
EFi,t −MFi,t = α∗i + β∗iMFi,t + εi,t, (23)
MFi,t = µi + δiVi,t + ζi,t, (24)
α∗i =
0 if Pi = 1α†i = z′iγα + ξi if Pi = 0 (25)
β∗i =
0 if Si = 1β†i = z′iγβ + ηi if Si = 0, (26)
Pi =
1 if qi = z
′
iψα + νi > 0
0 if qi = z′iψα + νi ≤ 0,
(27)
Si =
1 if wi = z
′
iψβ + ωi > 0
0 if wi = z′iψβ + ωi ≤ 0.
(28)
The first two equations are the first level of the model in which the difference between
EF andMF is linked toMF and where possible endogeneity ofMF is incorporated.
The second level of the model is given by the other four equations, where the param-
eters of the first level are linked to potentially explanatory variables. The benchmark
case α∗i = 0 and β
∗
i = 0 has a key position in this model.
To estimate the posterior results of the parameters of this model, namely
θ = ({β†i }Ni=1, {α†i}Ni=1, {µi}Ni=1, {δi}Ni=1, γ′α, γ′β, ψ′α, ψ′β, {Ωi}Ni=1, σ2ξ , σ2η), the Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methodology, and in particular Gibbs sampling, is used.
Technical details on this sampler are presented in Appendix B. We are especially in-
terested in the values of parameters {β†i }Ni=1, {α†i}Ni=1, γα, γβ , ψα, ψβ and {Ωi}Ni=1, as
these represent the behavior of the experts and how this behavior is governed by other
factors.
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4.2 Evaluating forecasts
The estimated parameters of the model in the previous section can be used to test
Hypotheses 1 to 5 about the behavior of experts. However, we are also interested in
what the experts should do, which is the subject of the Statements and Hypothesis 6.
As the Statements follow straightforwardly from optimization of the forecast accuracy
target function there is no need to test it. However, the rules to follow according to
these statements are quite complex and therefore Hypothesis 6 comprises a simpler set
of rules to follow. To test the validity of Hypothesis 6 we need one additional model
which we propose in this subsection. In this model we use a measure of the forecast
precision of the expert as compared to the forecast precision of the model and relate
this with variables as mentioned in Hypothesis 6.
LetDRMSPEi be the improvement in root mean squared prediction error ofEFi,t
over MFi,t, thus
DRMSPEi =
√
1
Ti
∑
(Ri,t −MFi,t)2 −
√
1
Ti
∑
(Ri,t − EFi,t)2. (29)
We use this criterium instead of DSPE to reduce variability. With the regression
model
DRMSPEi = r
′
iϑ+ ιi, (30)
it is possible to test which factors influence forecast improvement.
First of all, we want to test if α∗ = 0 indeed increases forecast improvement, as
compared to cases where α∗ 6= 0. This is the first part of Hypothesis 6a. We also want
to test if, assuming that α∗ is different from 0, a smaller value of α∗ in absolute sense is
beneficial to the forecast improvement (second part of Hypothesis 6a). Therefore, we
consider the estimates of Pi and the estimates of |α†i (1− Pi)| as explanatory variables
in (30), where we use the posterior means for Pi and α†. We call the first variable in
the remainder of this paper ‘No intercept’ and following Hypothesis 6a we expect this
variable to have a positive effect. The second variable is called ‘Size intercept’ and
following Hypothesis 6b we expect this variable to have a negative effect.
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To test if β∗ = 0 (or β in (2) equals 1) increases forecast improvement compared
to β∗ 6= 0 (first part of Hypothesis 6b), we add the posterior mean for Si. The second
part of Hypothesis 6b, namely that a larger absolute value of β∗ decreases forecast
improvement, is tested by using the estimates of |β†i (1−Si)| as an explanatory variable,
where we again use the posterior mean for Si and we use the posterior mean for β
†
i .
These variables will carry the labels ‘Relation MF’ and ‘Size relation MF’ and we
expect the first variable to have a positive effect and the second variable to have a
negative effect.
Hypothesis 6c states thatDRMSPE increases if the correlation betweenMF and
I decreases. To test this we use ρΩ,i = Ωi(1, 2)/
√
Ωi(1, 1)Ωi(2, 2) as an explanatory
variable, where we use the posterior mean for Ωi, label ρΩ,i ‘Endogeneity’, and we
expect a parameter with a negative value.
Finally, by including in (30) ρεR,i = corr(εi,t, Ri,t) Hypothesis 6d is considered.
That is, the correlation between the estimated errors of (15) and the realized values
of the variable of interest is used to see if correlation between the expert intuition
and the true values increases the forecasts. The errors of (15), εi,t, are estimated as
EFi,t −MFi,t − α†i (1− Pi)− β†i (1− Si)MFi,t, using the posterior means for α†i , β†i ,
Pi and Si. The variable ρεR,i is labeled ‘Intuition’ in the remainder of the paper and
following Hypothesis 6d we expect it to have a positive effect in (30).
Concluding, we have for (30) the set of six explanatory variables
r′i = [1, Pi, |α†i (1− Pi)|, Si, |β†i (1− Si)|, ρΩ,i, ρεR,i]. (31)
See Table 1 for an overview of the variables in ri, the names of the variables and for
the hypothetical sign of the parameters in (30) following Hypothesis 6.
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Table 1: A summary of the variables in ri in model (30) and their hypothetical effect on DRMSPE
as denoted in (29) according to Hypothesis 6.
Hypothetical
Name Variable effect
No intercept Pi +
Size intercept |α†i (1− Pi)| −
Relation MF Si +
Size relation MF |β†i (1− Si)| −
Endogeneity ρΩ,i −
Intuition ρεR,i +
5 Empirical results
To illustrate the usefulness of our two models we make use of an extensive panel data
set. The data set covers SKU-level sales data and is described in detail in the next
subsection. In Subsections 5.2 and 5.3 the results of our analysis are discussed.
5.1 Data set
For our case study we use monthly sales data of a large pharmaceutical company.
The company has its headquarters in The Netherlands, and has local offices in various
countries. The company uses an automated statistical package to create forecasts using
lagged sales figures as the only input. Each month model selection and parameter
estimation are updated, whereby the package uses techniques such as Box-Jenkins and
Holt-Winters. These model forecasts are then sent to the managers in the local offices,
after which they quote their own forecasts.
We have at our disposal model forecasts, manager forecasts and actual sales figures
for November 2004 through November 2006, with for 1-step-ahead forecasts a maxi-
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mum of 25 triplets per product (medicine), for 2-step-ahead forecasts a maximum of
24 triplets and so on. We have a total of 7250 time series for 1167 different products
in 7 different categories, sold in 36 countries. For each series, two observations are
lost, because of the instrumental variable we used (see below). Therefore, for each
series we have a minimum of 10 observations, a maximum of 23 observations and the
forecast horizon ranges from 1 to 7 months.
In the notation of Appendix A and Table A.1 this means that we have N = 7250,
J = 1167 and the maximum of Hj for j = 1, .., 1167 is 7. Because there is one man-
ager per country responsible for the expert forecasts, we have M = 36. Furthermore,
t = 1 corresponds with the month October 2004 and T corresponds with October 2006
(forecast origin).
As an instrumental variable in (22) we need a variable that correlates with the
model forecasts, but not with the expert forecasts, see, for example, Heij et al. (2004,
p. 396-418). The instrumental variable Vi,t that we use is Ri,t−(h+1) −MFi,t−(h+1),
where Ri,t−(h+1) concerns case i in month t − (h + 1) and MFi,t−(h+1) is the asso-
ciated model forecast.3 So, as instrumental variable we use the most recent forecast
error of the model forecast that has the same forecast horizon and that is known at
the moment of forecast creation. Franses and Legerstee (2009) show that this variable
often does not correlate much with the difference between model forecasts and expert
forecasts. Because we do think it correlates with model forecasts (because of the way
model forecasts are created), we believe that expert forecasts and this instrument are
not strongly correlated.
The variables that we use as explanatory variables in (16), (17), (20) and (21) and
included in vector zi are average sales volume, sales volatility and dummy variables
for the forecast horizon. We also include dummy variables for the country (and by that
for the manager responsible for forecasting) and dummy variables for the category of
3We use the same notation as in Appendix A. Thus for MF the second subscript indicates in which
period the forecasts are created. In case ofR the second subscript indicates in which period the forecasts
are created to which the realization belongs, thus it is the realization of period t− 1.
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a product.
The optimal values for α and β depend on conditions (13) and (14) as defined in
Section 3, which are conditions on the bias and relative bias of the model forecasts.
Furthermore, the more the conditions are not met, the less likely it is that Hypothesis
6 is true. Therefore, it is first useful to find out to what extent these conditions are met
for our data. To get insight into this we tested for each case i if there is a significant
difference between the mean of MF and the mean of R (condition (13)) and if there
is a significant difference between the mean of MF times R and the mean of MF 2
(condition (14)). For this, we used the common small-sample test for comparing two
population means as described in Wackerly et al. (2002). We find that condition (13)
is rejected in about 17% of the cases and condition (14) in 6% of the cases, where
we use a 5% significance level. The test requires the samples to be drawn from a
normal distribution. According to the Jarque-Bera test, the hypotheses of normality
are not rejected in only 61% of the cases. In again around 17% of these cases (for
which both null hypotheses of normality are not rejected) condition (13) is rejected at
the 5% significance level. To test the second condition, both the MF times R sample
and the MF 2 sample need to be drawn from a normal distribution. Here, according
to the Jarque-Bera test, the hypotheses of normality are not rejected in 53% of the
cases and in around 7% of these cases (for which both null hypotheses of normality
are not rejected) condition (14) is rejected at the 5% significance level. Thus although
the normality assumption does not always hold, we can state with fair confidence that
condition (13) holds in about 83% of the cases and condition (14) holds in about 93%
of the cases.
5.2 Expert Behavior
To estimate the parameters of the model described in Section 4.1 we generate 80,000
iterations of the Gibbs sampler as described in Appendix B. The first 40,000 iterations
are used as burn-in sample, and of the last 40,000 iterations every 10th draw is retained
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and used to calculate mean and standard deviation of the draws. Iteration plots are
inspected to check for convergence and are available upon request.
The probability that β∗ = β − 1 = 0 is varying, which can be seen from the
histogram in Figure 1 showing the posterior means for Si for i = 1, ..., N . The largest
group of cases (2254) has a probability of less than 0.1 that β∗i = 0. All the other
cases have probabilities that are equally spread between 0.1 and 1. 2718 cases have
a probability higher than 0.5, indicating that in less than 40% of the cases β in (2) is
likely to be close to 1.
Figure 1: Histogram of posterior means for Si in (19), for i = 1, ..., N .
Figure 2 shows a histogram of the posterior means for β†i for which the posterior
mean for Si < 0.5 and for which the posterior mean for−1 < β†i < 1. The smallest β†i
is estimated as -1.14 and the largest is 1.5, but only 11 of the estimated β†i are below
-1 and only 17 above 1. In the remainder of this section, we use I[Si < 0.5]β
†
i as
estimated β∗i and I[Pi < 0.5]α
†
i as estimated α
∗
i , where I[·] is an indicator function
which takes a value 1 if the expression between brackets is true and 0 otherwise and
with posterior means for Si, β
†
i , Pi and α
†
i . We find that 2406 of the 4532 β
∗
i values, that
are estimated to be different from 0, are positive. Thus although part a of Hypothesis
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1 seems to hold for this data set, part b of this Hypothesis is not supported: β is often
different from 1, but when it is different from 1, it is just as likely smaller than 1 than it
is larger than 1. However, we do see a fatter tail to the left than to the right: β is more
often much lower than 1 than much higher than 1. Finally, note that β is not often
close to 0, indicating that almost all managers producing forecasts in this data set look
at the model forecasts to some extent.
Figure 2: Histogram of posterior means for β†i in (17) for which the posterior mean for Si < 0.5, the
posterior mean for β†i > −1 and the posterior mean for β†i < 1, for i = 1, ..., N .
Figure 3 shows a histogram of posterior means for Pi for i = 1, ..., N . We see that
the probability that α∗ = α = 0 is often very high. In only 1030 of the 7250 cases
the probability is lower than 0.5 and in 5469 cases it is higher than 0.9. Thus, part a of
Hypothesis 2 does not seem to hold: not often is α 6= 0 and is there a constant bias in
the expert forecasts as compared to the model forecasts.
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Figure 3: Histogram of posterior means for Pi in (18), for i = 1, ..., N .
Figure 4 shows a histogram of posterior means for α†i for the cases for which the
posterior mean for Pi < 0.5 and for which the posterior mean for −200 < α†i < 4000.
The smallest estimated α†i is -609.39 and the largest is 228587.73. Only 2 estimated
α†i ’s are smaller than -200, but still 135 are larger than 4000. Thus, looking at the
histogram and at the values not included in the histogram, we can conclude that the
estimated α†i ’s are strongly positively skewed. Only in 44 of the cases is the estimated
α negative, supporting part b of Hypothesis 2: when α is different from 0, it is often
positive.
We observe that the first two hypotheses (1 and 2) are only partly validated. But
to what extent are the expert forecasts positively biased, as is often found in previous
research (see Section 2.1)? This is the case when α∗ is larger than 0, while β∗ is 0 or
also larger than 0, or when β∗ is larger than 0, while α∗ equals 0. We find that in only
2516 cases this seems to hold, which is a little over one third of the cases.
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Figure 4: Histogram of posterior means for α†i in (16) for which the posterior mean for Pi < 0.5 and
the posterior mean for −200 < α†i < 4000, for i = 1, ..., N .
To see if the deviations of β∗ from 0 follow the rules that hypothetically optimize
the forecast improvement of EF over MF , we calculate the correlation between the
posterior mean for β∗i and βi,opt =
Cov[MFi,t,Ri,t]−Cov[MFi,tIi,t]
V [MFi,t]
for i = 1, ..., N . In Sec-
tion 3 we derived that the optimal value of βi is given by this fraction in (9). We obtain
a positive correlation of 0.11.
To get more insights, we also counted how often the posterior mean for β∗ is posi-
tive while (Cov[MFi,t, Ri,t]−Cov[MFi,tIi,t]) > V [MFi,t] plus how often the posterior
mean for β∗ is negative while (Cov[MFi,t, Ri,t] − Cov[MFi,tIi,t]) < V [MFi,t]. This
appears to occur in 37% of the cases. The exact opposite is true in only 25% of the
cases. Thus, according to (9), in 25% of the cases β∗ has the wrong sign, while 37%
has the correct sign. The remaining 2719 cases have a probability of 50% or higher
that β∗ = 0. For those cases, the difference between βi,opt and 1 is on average 0.69,
and βi,opt varies between −51.25 and 27.94 with a standard deviation of 1.80. For the
complete data set these values are 0.77 (average difference from 1), −51.25 (mini-
mum), 33.13 (maximum) and 1.89 (standard deviation). This all gives the impression
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that there are managers who recognize when β should be different from 1 and in which
direction it should be different.
Table 2: Posterior means (and standard deviations) for the parameters in the second level of the model
about expert behavior, described in Subsection 4.1. Columns 2 to 5 contain the posterior means for part
of γα, ψα, γβ , and ψβ , respectively.
Variable κ α† λ β†
c 0.821 -35.361 -0.454 -0.061
(0.124) (4.501) (0.154) (0.019)
R -2.142e-05 0.592 -8.969e-06 -2.164e-06
(3.868e-06) (2.616e-04) (2.897e-06) (3.777e-07)
Vol(R) 2.077e-04 -0.354 4.477e-05 1.224e-05
(2.997e-05) (0.002) (1.664e-05) (2.188e-06)
Hor 2 -0.085 1.304 -0.030 -0.002
(0.095) (2.638) (0.101) (0.013)
Hor 3 -0.164 1.189 -0.061 -0.014
(0.094) (3.168) (0.102) (0.014)
Hor 4 -0.036 5.039 -0.131 -0.005
(0.095) (2.875) (0.104) (0.013)
Hor 5 -0.106 6.126 -0.181 -0.021
(0.095) (2.685) (0.108) (0.013)
Hor 6 -0.206 5.635 -0.368 -0.031
(0.100) (2.838) (0.115) (0.014)
Hor 7 -0.169 2.585 -0.557 -0.024
(0.102) (2.994) (0.121) (0.013)
We also formulated hypotheses (3 and 4) about factors that might influence the
value of α and β. To find out to what extent these hypotheses are valid for our data,
we have to take a look at the posterior means for the parameters in the second level of
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the model, that is, γα, γβ , ψα, ψβ . Part of the estimated coefficients can be found in
Table 2. First of all, we see support for part a of Hypothesis 4, that is, the average size
of sales is positively related with α in (2). We find very strong posterior evidence that
both the probability that α∗ is different from 0 and the level of α† increase with the
average size of sales.
We see that sales volatility has an opposite effect. The higher the volatility, the
lower the probability that α∗ differs from 0 and the lower the value of α†. For both
effects there is very strong posterior evidence. This contradicts part b of Hypothesis 4,
as we expected that more volatile sales would make a manager to overpredict in order
to prevent running out of stock.
Furthermore, we see that forecasts with a horizon of 2 to 7 months have on average
a lower probability that α∗ equals 0 as compared to forecasts with a horizon of just 1
month, with the horizon of 6 months having the lowest estimated coefficient. We also
see a parabolic effect of the forecast horizon on α†, with the highest α† for forecasts
for 5 and 6 months ahead. Although this seems to contradict part c of Hypothesis 4,
for this data these results are perfectly explainable. The management of the firm from
which we use the forecasting and sales figures informed us that the 6-month horizon
is an important planning horizon. This importance probably results in a suboptimal
value for α.
For β we find a significantly negative effect of average sales volume on the prob-
ability that β∗ is 0 and also a significantly negative relation between average sales
volume and β†, both supporting Hypothesis 3a. However, we have to keep in mind
that Hypothesis 3 was based on Hypothesis 1b stating that β† would be smaller than
0, and that this hypothesis has already been shown to be incorrect: β† is often larger
than 0. Thus, as long as β† is smaller than 0, it moves in the expected direction when
average sales volume increases, but when β† is larger than 0, it moves in the same, but
now unexpected direction. We calculated the average of (β†i )
2 differentiated to each
of the variables in zi to see if the variables had an influence on β
†
i moving away or
towards 0, but found only insignificant results. This confirms that the found relations
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are robust to a change of sign of β†i .
An increase in the volatility of sales results in a higher probability that β∗ equals 0
and in an increase in β†. As with the influence on α, this is not in line with what we
hypothesized.
Finally, we see that the longer the forecast horizon the smaller the probability that
β∗ = 0 and that β† is smallest for a forecast horizon of 6 months. This is in line with
part c of Hypothesis 3, again modified for this data set, because the 6-month horizon
is an important planning horizon.
The dummy variables for countries (and thus managers) and for medicine cate-
gories included in zi are often significantly related to the four dependent variables4.
Thus, on the basis of these results specific managers can be addressed when their α
and/or β values are not optimal for (part of) their forecasts and can be given feedback.
We are also interested in the correlation between MF and I in (2). Hypothesis 5
stated that expert forecasts are often related to external factors which are also related
to the model forecasts (endogeneity of MF in (2)). With Hypothesis 6 we stated that
a lower or more negative correlation between MF and I in (2) might be beneficial
to forecast accuracy. In order to evaluate the correlation between MF and I of the
expert forecasts we first have to address two issues. First, we need to know if the
instrument, which is the most recent model forecast error known at the moment of
forecast creation, is a relevant instrument. We find that in more than 70% of the cases
the posterior mean for δ in (22) is significantly different from 0, so we can conclude
that we used a fairly relevant instrument.
Second, we need to know if the instrument is a valid instrument, that is, is it un-
related to expert forecasts? To that extent, we calculate the correlation between the
estimated error terms in the first level of the model, εi,t, and the instrument. We find
that the correlation in 2451 cases is < −0.3 and in 572 cases is > 0.3. Thus, the
estimated β†i might be over- or underestimated and this might give a false impression
4The estimated coefficients for these dummy variables are not shown here, but are available upon
request.
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on what it is the managers do. However, it is hard to find a better instrumental variable
for this data set and the validity is certainly not completely rejected.
Figure 5: Histogram of posterior means for ρΩ,i, correlation between εi,t in (23) and ζi,t in (24), for
i = 1, ..., N .
The endogeneity in (2) can now be measured by the correlation in the posterior
mean for Ωi, that is, by the posterior mean for ρΩ,i = Ωi(1, 2)/
√
Ωi(1, 1)Ωi(2, 2) for
all i. The estimated correlations are depicted in Figure 5. The result is surprising. We
might expect positive correlations, indicating that factors influencing model forecasts
influence the expert forecasts in the same way, resulting in double counting. However,
we mainly find negative correlations (in almost 90% of the cases). This would mean
that factors influencing the level of model forecasts have an opposite effect on expert
forecasts. In Hypothesis 6c we stated that such a negative correlation would benefit the
forecast improvement of the expert forecasts over that of the model forecasts. In sum,
it seems that the experts are properly adjusting model forecasts, but to what extent this
is useful will be discussed in the next section.
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Figure 6: Histogram of the correlations between realized sales Ri,t and the posterior mean for εi,t
from (15), for i = 1, ..., N .
Finally, it might be interesting to take a look at the correlation between the esti-
mated error terms of the first level of the model, εi,t, and realized sales, as we have
seen that this influences the forecast accuracy too. A histogram of these correlations
can be found in Figure 6. The correlations are pretty much symmetrically centered
around 0, with just a little more positive correlations than negative. This time, it would
be preferred that the correlations is positive, see equation (4) and Hypothesis 6. How-
ever, the more model forecasts and realized values are related, the more difficult it is
to add intuition to the model forecasts that is negatively related to model forecasts and
positively related to the realized values. As we almost always see a negative endo-
geneity, this might explain why we also often see a negative relation between realized
values and intuition. Probably the managers too often wrongly correct the model fore-
casts using factors also influencing these model forecasts, resulting in intuition I being
negatively correlated with the realized values R.
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5.3 Forecast Evaluation
In Table 3 we give the estimated coefficients of model (30). First of all, we see that
an expert who produces forecasts with α = 0, β = 1 and no correlation between the
residuals in (2) and the model forecasts and between the residuals in (2) and realized
sales, performs on average better than the model. This can be seen from the sum of
the estimated constant c and the estimated coefficients for the variables No intercept
and Relation MF being positive. An expert who produces forecasts with α different
from 0, β different from 1, but not larger than approximately 1.51 or smaller than
approximately 0.49 and the correlations equal to 0, produces on average less accurate
forecasts than the model. These values for the variables, that is, No intercept, Relation
MF, Endogeneity and Intuition equal to 0, Size intercept positively valued and Size
relation MF smaller than 0.51, multiplied by the estimated coefficients and summed
up together with the estimated constant c, result in a negative DRMSPE.
Table 3: Estimated coefficients of the forecast evaluation model (30). Coefficients that are significantly
different from 0 at the 5%-level are indicated by ‘*’.
Estimated
Variable coefficient
c -454.136*
No intercept 46.071
Size intercept -0.067*
Relation MF 459.968*
Size relation MF 887.618*
Endogeneity -345.276*
Intuition 830.285*
A decrease in the probability that α = α∗ = 0 or in the probability that β∗ = 0
(equivalent to β = 1) both decrease on average the forecast accuracy of the expert fore-
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casts as compared to the model forecasts. This confirms parts a and b of Hypothesis 6.
Furthermore, we see a significantly negative coefficient for the size of the parameter
α† which supports the second part of Hypothesis 6a.
The fifth estimated coefficient is not in line with Hypothesis 6b. According to
this estimated coefficient, β† moving away from 0 results on average in an increasing
DRMSPE. Note however, that the variable ‘Size relation MF’ has to be larger than
0.518 in order to make up for the loss in accuracy due to S 6= 1. DRMSPE is on
average approximately 460 higher for S = 1 than for S = 0, ceteris paribus, and
only when |β†i (1 − Si)| > 0.518 is this same level of forecast accuracy improvement
achieved. Of the 7250 cases, this happens only 139 times (looking at posterior means
for the parameters), which is in less than 2% of the cases, thus in general it is still more
beneficial to have β = 1 than β 6= 1.
The fact that values of β further away from 1 result in more accurate forecasts as
compared to model forecasts than values of β closer to 1, has probably to do with the
correlation between the optimal β and the bias and relative bias in model forecasts and
the endogeneity of the model forecasts in (2). This is confirmed by the fact that we
found a positive correlation between the optimal value of βi and the estimated β∗i in
the previous section.
The next two estimated coefficients, corresponding to the correlation of intuition
with model forecasts and of intuition with realized values, have the expected signs
again. Hypotheses 6c and 6d get support as we find that a lower correlation between
MF and I increases the forecast accuracy of expert forecasts and a higher correla-
tion between intuition and realized sales increases the forecast accuracy of the expert
forecasts.
Recall though from Section 3 that it is probably hard to achieve both a negative (or
lower) correlation between intuition and model forecasts and a positive (or higher) cor-
relation between intuition and realized values, as model forecasts and realized values
should be strongly related. Therefore we are interested to see how often the intuition
of the expert increases the forecast accuracy relative to the model forecasts. According
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to the model this is the case when the sum of the variables Endogeneity and Intuition
both multiplied by its estimated coefficient is positive. We find this to be true in 77%
of the cases.
We can also look at (12), where we presented the theoretical condition under which
intuition improves forecast accuracy. To test how often this is the case for our data we
use 2[Cov(Ri,t, εi,t)−βCov(MFi,t, εi,t)] > Var(εi,t) for all i, with posterior means for
εi,t. We find that only in 953 cases this inequality holds, and thus only in approximately
13% of the cases is intuition helpful in improving forecast accuracy.
We can conclude, at least for this data set, that the rules to follow for an expert
formulated in Hypothesis 6 are a bit too simple and general. There seem to be experts
who do recognize the situations in which the model forecasts are (relatively) biased
and who are able to correct, at least partly, this bias. But, on average, an expert who
does follow the rules formulated in Hypothesis 6 does perform better than the model
and there are not many experts able to improve on the performance of this set of rules
by choosing alternative values for α and β. Furthermore, it seems hard to improve the
model forecasts by adding intuition.
6 Conclusions
Expert forecasts, created once statistical model forecasts are available, are quite often
discussed in the literature, but still not much is known about how expert forecasts are
created. Often the expert forecasts are analyzed on their forecasting performance with-
out a proper analysis of what it is the experts actually did. In this paper we formulated
hypotheses about the behavior of experts and about the impact of that behavior on
forecast accuracy. We proposed a model to find out how expert forecasts are created
in relation to model forecasts and to find out which factors influence this behavior.
We proposed a novel and innovative two-level Hierarchical Bayes model in which we
also take into account that the model forecasts might be endogenous. The observed
behavior could then be linked to forecasting performance.
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We applied this model to a large data set consisting of model and expert forecasts
and realizations of SKU-level sales data. The results for our data set were interesting
and sometimes quite surprising. We found that in about one third of our expert fore-
casts there is a structural upward bias. There might be a bias in expert forecasts as
compared to model forecasts, but at first it is unclear whether this is because the expert
adds to the model forecasts or because the expert does not look at the model forecasts
and creates own independent forecasts. We found that in approximately 37% of the
cases there is a one-to-one relation between model forecasts and expert forecasts. In
50% of the remaining cases the expert reacts excessively to the model forecasts and in
the other 50% of the remaining cases the expert only partially takes the model forecasts
into account, if at all.
The intercept and the coefficient in the linear relation between expert forecasts and
model forecasts were significantly influenced by factors such as average sales volume,
sales volatility and forecasting horizon.
We furthermore found that the experts often take other factors into account that
also influence the model forecasts. However, often this makes the expert forecasts to
deviate in the opposite direction than that the model forecasts were influenced. Thus,
we often find endogeneity of the model forecasts, or, to be more precise, a negative cor-
relation between the model forecasts and the error terms in the linear relation between
expert forecasts and model forecasts. Finally, we found different kinds of relations
between the intuition of the experts (other factors than model forecasts influencing the
expert forecasts) and the realized sales values.
Theoretically, when the model forecasts are unbiased and relative unbiased as com-
pared to the realized values (see Section 3), then expert forecasts which are related
to model forecasts in a linear relation with coefficient equal to 1 and intercept equal
to 0, would be most accurate as long as intuition and model forecasts are unrelated.
However, we find in our data set that the conditions for this (unbiasedness and rela-
tive unbiasedness of the model forecasts) are not always met, and that some experts
are probably able to recognize this and correct for it. Furthermore, as soon as endo-
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geneity of the model forecasts is introduced (correlation between intuition and model
forecasts), things get more complicated and it is harder to draw straightforward con-
clusions about the optimal values of the coefficients and of the correlation between the
residuals and model forecasts and of the correlation between the residuals and realized
values. In general, experts who follow some simple rules, which optimize forecast
performance under optimal circumstances, outperform the model forecasts in our data
set. However, some experts who deviate from these rules, especially those for which
β is further away from 1 and for which the error terms are negatively related to the
model forecasts, also perform very well. We found that this has probably to do with
the fact that these experts have to deal with poor model forecasts.
There are three main challenges in this area of research. The first is to apply the
techniques described in this paper to other data sets. Our results are interesting and
very informative, but are limited to the sales data of one company. It would be worth-
while using (sales) data from other companies or from other research areas, such as
macroeconomics, to see if our results extend to other situations too.
The second challenge is to find and use appropriate instruments to deal with the
endogeneity of model forecasts. Although we seemed to have done a pretty good job
in our data set, the instrument we used is probably not perfect and this might influence
the conclusions that we have drawn. In new research the most difficult task, besides
finding a useful data set, is probably to find appropriate instruments.
Finally, in many forecasting situations only expert forecasts are available to the re-
searcher and no model forecasts. It would be interesting to investigate ways to retrieve
these model forecasts from the available data.
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Appendices
A Typical data format
In this appendix we describe the data format as assumed in Section 4 and which is
typical for forecast practices in which we have forecasts for multiple time periods and
multiple variables. The data as described and used in Section 5 also follow this format.
Let X be a general notation for the variables MF (model forecast), EF (expert fore-
cast) and R (realized value). After cleaning up the data set (in which for example all
forecasts for which no realizations are available are removed) the typical data format
for X is as in Table A.1.
The first four columns give the characteristics of X in the columns after that. The
first column indicates which expert m receives the model forecasts and creates the
expert forecasts. In case X = R it indicates which expert created the expert forecasts
for the realizations in that row. In total there are M experts.
The second column indicates for which variable (possibly product) the forecasts are
created or to which variable (product) the realized values belong. Although different
experts might produce forecasts, for example, for the same product in, for example,
different geographical area’s, we gave these variables a different index number j for
the different experts and we analyze them as different variables. Thus, for a given
forecast horizon (column 3) each variable number is unique and that variable is being
forecasted by only one specific expert. Furthermore, the variables might be grouped
into different (product) groups. This would result in an extra column with an index
indicating to which group the variable belongs, but we did not depict such a column
in Table A.1. The first expert is responsible for J1 variables and in total there are J
variables being forecasted.
The third column shows for X = MF and X = EF for which forecast horizon
the forecasts are created and forX = R for which forecast horizon the belonging fore-
casts are created. Hj denotes the longest forecast horizon for product j. For different
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products, the largest forecast horizon might be different. Thus for the first product H1
might be 7, while for the second product H2 might be 5.
The fourth column sums up the information in the first three columns by a unique
index number and indicates the cases. One case is one of the time series, thus one line
in the table, and encompasses the forecasts and the realizations of those forecasts for
which the expert forecasts are created by one and the same expert and for which the
forecasts are created for one and the same product and over one and the same forecast
horizon. The index i is an integer between 1 and N , the total number of cases.
Columns 5 to T + 4 give the forecasts as created in period t or the realizations
belonging to those forecasts, thus the realizations in period t+ h. Thus the first entry,
X1,1, gives the model forecast or expert forecast created in period t = 1 for period 2 or
for X = R it gives the realized value of period 2. The entry below that, X2,1 gives the
model forecast or expert forecast created in period t = 1 for period 3 or for X = R it
gives the realized value of period 3. For the table with X = R the rows with different
h, but the same j contain the same values, but in different columns. Thus the second
row in Table A.1 is the same as the first row, but the entries are shifted one column to
the left and the third row is the same as the second row, but again the entries are shifted
one column to the left and so on.
The maximum number of observations for a case is T , but as we have missing
observations for some i, this results in Ti observations for case i.
Finally, note that the matrix with the values for the instrumental variable V as in
(22) has the same format as for EF , MF and R. Vi,t is the instrumental variable value
for MFi,t, where Vi,t for our case study is as described in Section 5.1.
B Parameter estimation
In this appendix we describe the method used to estimate the parameters of the two-
level Hierarchical Bayes model described in Section 4.1. The Markov Chain Monte
Carlo methodology is used, in particular, the Gibbs sampling technique in combination
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with data augmentation.
Model parameters sampled are θ = ({β†i }Ni=1, {α†i}Ni=1, {µi}Ni=1, {δi}Ni=1, γ′α, γ′β, ψ′α,
ψ′β, {Ωi}Ni=1, σ2ξ , σ2η). The latent variables Pi, Si, qi and wi, i = 1, ..., N are sampled
alongside with the model parameters.
We apply in this appendix the more general notation yi,t for EFi,t and xi,t for
MFi,t. Furthermore, let yi be a Ti × 1 vector (yi,1, ..., yi,Ti)′ with a similar definition
for xi and vi.
To derive the likelihood function, we first consider the density function of the data
yi = {yi,t}Tit=1 and xi = {xi,t}Tit=1 given Pi, Si and θ:
fkl,i = f(yi, xi|Pi = k, Si = l, θ) =
Ti∏
t=1
Φ(yi,t, xi,t|mkl,i,t,Ωi) (32)
where Φ is the multivariate normal density function, k and l can take values 0 and 1,
mkl,i,t is the mean vector when Pi = k and Si = l and Ωi is the covariance matrix. We
have
m11,i,t = (xi,t, µi + δivi,t)
′
m01,i,t = (α
†
i + xi,t, µi + δivi,t)
′
m10,i,t = (xi,t + β
†
i xi,t, µi + δivi,t)
′
m00,i,t = (α
†
i + xi,t + β
†
i xi,t, µi + δivi,t)
′. (33)
The complete data likelihood is then
f({yi}Ni=1, {xi}Ni=1, {Pi}Ni=1, {Si}Ni=1|θ) =
N∏
i=1
(f11,iκiλi)
PiSi
(f01,i(1− κi)λi)(1−Pi)Si(f10,iκi(1− λi))Pi(1−Si)
(f00,i(1− κi)(1− λi))(1−Pi)(1−Si)φ(αi|z′iγα, σ2ξ )φ(βi|z′iγβ, σ2η), (34)
with φ the normal density function.
We impose flat priors on most parameters. For the covariance of εi,t and ζi,t,
thus for Ωi, we use an inverted Wishart prior with prΩ,sh = 1 degree of freedom
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and scale parameter prΩ,sc = 100 ∗ I2, where Im denotes an m-dimensional iden-
tity matrix. For σ2ξ and σ
2
η , we use an inverted Gamma-2 prior with shape parameter
prσ2ξ ,sh = prσ2η ,sh = 1 and scale parameters prσ2ξ ,sc = 0.001 and prσ2η ,sc = 1. Fi-
nally, for ψα and ψβ we impose normal priors with mean 0 and covariance matrix
prψα = prψα = 4Ig, where g is the number of variables in zi. These priors are imposed
to improve the performance of the algorithm and to reduce the number of iterations
needed for convergence, but the influence of these priors on the posterior distribution
is only marginal.
B.1 Sampling of Pi and Si
The full conditional posterior distribution of Pi for i = 1, ..., N is given by
Pr[Pi = 1|θ, data] = κi(f11,i + f10,i)
κi(f11,i + f10,i) + (1− κi)(f01,i + f00,i) , (35)
and hence we can sample Pi from a Bernoulli distribution with parameters n = 1 and
p = Pr[Pi = 1|θ, data]. Si can also be sampled from a Bernoulli distribution with
n = 1, but with p = Pr[Si = 1|θ, data], where
Pr[Si = 1|θ, data] = λi(f11,i + f01,i)
λi(f11,i + f01,i) + (1− λi)(f10,i + f00,i) . (36)
B.2 Sampling of qi and wi
The full conditional posterior distribution of qi is
qi|θ, data ∼
N(z
′
iψα, 1)I[qi > 0] if Pi = 1
N(z′iψα, 1)I[qi ≤ 0] if Pi = 0,
(37)
which is in both cases the pdf of a truncated normal distribution. The inverse CDF
technique is used to sample qi. The sampling of wi is analogous to the sampling of qi,
but then with ψβ instead of ψα, with wi instead of qi and with Si instead of Pi.
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B.3 Sampling of ψα and ψβ
To sample ψα, we notice that conditional on {zi}Ni=1 and on the sampled {qi}Ni=1 we
have qi = z′iψα + νi, with νi ∼ N(0, 1). Thus, ψα can be sampled from a multi-
variate normal distribution with mean (
∑N
i=1 z
′
iz
′
i + pr
−1
ψα
)−1(
∑N
i=1 ziqi) and variance
(
∑N
i=1 ziz
′
i + pr
−1
ψα
)−1. Following the same line of thought, ψβ can be sampled from
a multivariate normal distribution with mean (
∑N
i=1 z
′
iz
′
i + pr
−1
ψβ
)−1(
∑N
i=1 ziwi) and
variance (
∑N
i=1 ziz
′
i + pr
−1
ψβ
)−1.
B.4 Sampling of µi and δi
To derive the full conditional posterior of µi and δi, we need to take into account that
(εi,t, ζi,t)
′ ∼MN(0,Ωi). We therefore write,
xi,t = µi + δivi,t + ρ(yi,t − α†i (1− Pi)− xi,t − β†i xi,t(1− Si)) + ei,t, (38)
with ρ = σεζ,i/σ2ε,i and ei,t ∼ N(0, σ2e,i), where σ2e,i = σ2ζ,i − σ2εζ,i/σ2ε,i. Now µi and
δi can be sampled from a multivariate normal distribution with mean (X˜ ′iX˜i)
−1(X˜ ′iy˜i)
and covariance σ2e,i(X˜
′
iX˜i)
−1, where X˜i is the Ti × 2 matrix containing the constant
and vi and y˜i is the vector containing for every t in i y˜i,t = xi,t− ρ(yi,t−α†i (1−Pi)−
xi,t − β†i xi,t(1− Si)).
B.5 Sampling of Ωi
Conditional on the other parameters, the covariance matrix Ωi can be sampled from
an inverted Wishart distribution with scale parameter
∑Ti
t=1(εi,t, ζi,t)
′(εi,t, ζi,t) + prΩ,sc
and degrees of freedom Ti + prΩsh, with εi,t = yi,t−α†i (1−Pi)−xi,t−β†i xi,t(1−Si)
and with ζi,t = xi,t − µi − δivi,t.
B.6 Sampling of γα and γβ
We have α†i = z
′
iγα + ξi, ∀Pi = 0 and with ξi ∼ N(0, σ2ξ ). Thus, γα
can be sampled from a multivariate normal distribution with mean (
∑N
i=1 ziz
′
i(1 −
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Pi))
−1(
∑N
i=1 ziα
†
i (1− Pi)) and variance σ2ξ (
∑N
i=1 ziz
′
i(1− Pi))−1. Similarly, we have
β†i = z
′
iγβ + ηi, ∀Si = 0, with ηi ∼ N(0, σ2η). Thus, γβ can be sampled from a multi-
variate normal distribution with mean (
∑N
i=1 ziz
′
i(1− Si))−1(
∑N
i=1 ziβ
†
i (1− Si)) and
variance σ2η(
∑N
i=1 ziz
′
i(1− Si))−1.
B.7 Sampling of σ2ξ and σ2η
Conditional on the data and the other parameters, σ2ξ has an inverted Gamma-2 dis-
tribution with scale parameter
∑N
t=1 ξ
2
i (1 − Pi) + prσ2ξ ,sc and degrees of freedom∑N
i=1(1 − Pi) + prσ2ξ ,sh, where we define ξi = α
†
i − z′iγα. To sample σ2ξ , we use
that ∑N
t=1 ξ
2
i (1− Pi) + prσ2ξ ,sc
σ2ξ
∼ χ2
(
N∑
i=1
(1− Pi) + prσ2ξ ,sh
)
. (39)
The sampling of σ2η is analogous to the sampling of σ
2
ξ . Thus we have, conditional on
the other parameters and data,∑N
i=1 η
2
i (1− Si) + prσ2η ,sc
σ2η
∼ χ2
(
N∑
i=1
(1− Si) + prσ2η ,sh
)
, (40)
where ηi = β
†
i − z′iγβ .
B.8 Sampling of α†i
To sample α†i we consider ∀Pi = 0,
yi,t = α
†
i + xi,t + β
†
i xi,t(1− Si) + ρ(xi,t − µi − δivi,t) + ei,t, (41)
with ρ = σεζ,i/σ2ζ,i and ei,t ∼ N(0, σ2e,i), where σ2e,i = σ2ε,i − σ2εζ,i/σ2ζ,i. Now we
consider, again ∀Pi = 0,
σ−1e,i (yi,t − xi,t − βixi,t(1− Si)− ρ(xi,t − µi − δivi,t)) = σ−1e,i α†i + σ−1e,i ei,t
σ−1ξ z
′
iγα = σ
−1
ξ α
†
i + σ
−1
ξ ξi (42)
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Hence we have created a linear regression model with unit variances which can be
written in vector notation
B = Aα†i + d, (43)
with d ∼ N(0, I) and where
B = (σ−1e,i (yi,1 − xi,1 − βixi,1(1− Si)− ρ(xi,1 − µi − δivi,1),
σ−1e,i (yi,2 − xi,2 − βixi,2(1− Si)− ρ(xi,2 − µi − δivi,2), ...,
σ−1e,i (yi,Ti − xi,Ti − βixi,Ti(1− Si)− ρ(xi,Ti − µi − δivi,Ti),
σ−1ξ z
′
iγα)
′
A = (σ−1e,i , σ
−1
e,i , ..., σ
−1
e,i , σ
−1
ξ )
′. (44)
Hence ∀Pi = 0, α†i can be sampled from a normal distribution with mean
(A′A)−1(A′B) and variance (A′A)−1.
∀Pi = 1 we sample α†i from a normal distribution with mean z′iγα and variance σ2ξ .
B.9 Sampling of β†i
To sample β†i we consider ∀Si = 0,
yi,t = α
†
i (1− Pi) + xi,t + β†i xi,t + ρ(xi,t − µi − δivi,t) + ei,t, (45)
with ρ and ei,t as defined above for the sampling of α
†
i . Now the sampling of β
†
i is
analogous to the sampling of α†i . So we consider ∀Si = 0,
σ−1e,i (yi,t − α†i (1− Pi)− xi,t − ρ(xi,t − µi − δivi,t)) = β†i (σ−1e,i xi,t) + σ−1e,i ei,t
σ−1η z
′
iγβ = σ
−1
η β
†
i + σ
−1
η ηi, (46)
and we have created a linear regression model with unit variances again and β†i can be
sampled from a normal distribution.
Again, ∀Si = 1 we sample β†i from a normal distribution with mean z′iγβ and variance
σ2η .
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